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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH

STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION,
et al.,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
-vs.-

Case No. 7785

COMMISSION OF FINANCE, et al.,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF DEFENDANTS

The questions raised in this proceeding seem to require a judicial clarification of certain important constitutional provisions involving the Board of Examiners,
the Finance Commission, the State Board of Education,
and the State Superintendent of Public Instruction.
The authors of this brief have no official connection
with any agency of the state government. They have
accepted this assignment in the hope that they may be
of some aid to the court in arriving at a correet solution
of the problems involved.
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STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
PoiNT I.
BATEMAN STILL OCCUPIES OFFICE TO WHICH HE
WAS ELECTED.

PoiNT II.
OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTR.UCTION AND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ABOLISHED.

PoiNT III.
CHAPTER 16, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 1951, UNCON.. STITUTIONAL.

PoiNT IV.
OFFICES ON BOARD OF EDUCATION VACANT.

ARGUMENT
PoiNT I.
BATEMAN STILL OCCUPIES OFFICE TO WHICH HE
WAS ELECTED.

Our research has brought us into agreement with
the Attorney General upon certain important points. It
is our purpose, therefore, to first state the extent of our
agreement, and thereafter set forth the points upon which
we disagree, with the reasons therefor.
The power and authority of the Board of Examine-rs
springs directly from the Constitution. The p·o:wer and
authority of the Finance c·ommission arises from legislative enactment. We are in agreement with the Attorney General that any conflict between the two agencies
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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s
must be resolved in favor of the Board of Exruniners.
The Finance Coininission 'Yas created to protect the taxpayers fro1n the improvident or unlawful expenditure
of public funds, but it is subordinate to the Board of
Examiners. This does not mean that the Board of Examiners is above or beyond lawful restraint. It cannot
make lawful a claim against the state if the· claim is in
fact not a lawful claim.
A State Board of Education lawfully constituted
and validly subsisting may, at the proper ti1ne, appoint
a State Superintendent of Public Instruction and fix
his salary, subject to the approval of the Board of Examiners. We feel forced to the conclusion that an approval by the Board of Examiners could not be vetoed
by the Finance Commission.
So far 've have been in at least qualified agreement
with the Attorney General, but we find ourselves in disagreement with some of his premises, and with his final
conclusions.
Under Point I, at page 10 of his brief, the Attorney
General says :
"S-uperintendent Bateman's te-rm wa:s shortened, but the office was not abolished and no vacancy
was created.
"The offices of members of the Board were
not abolished and no vacancies we-re created."
Therein lies the point of our departure. The language just quoted states the Attorney Gene.ral's fundamental premise. We disagree with the premise and the
conclusions drawn from it.
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The two amendments discussed by the Attorney
General were both adopted by the people on November
5, 1950. They expressed the solemn judgment of the
people. They relate to a single subject and embrace a
single plan and purpose. Whether this court shall follow and apply that line of cases which hold that the
effective date of a constitutional amendment may be suspended for a reasonable time pending the enactment of
implementing legislation or the line of cases which hold
that in the absence of expressed conditions or reservations an amendment becomes immediately effective upon
its adoption, this court cannot approve the conclusion
advocated by the Attorney General without defeating and
frustrating the expressed purpose and intention of the
electorate.
Previously, the management of the public school
system was vested in an elective Superintendent of Public
Instruction and an appointive Board of Education. On
November 5, 1950, the people expressed their determination that the management of the public schoo1 system
should reside in an elective Board of Education and an
appointive superintendent. It is respectfully suggested
that there is no room for any inference that the electorate
intended that after November 5th, 1950, the legislature
should, for a long p·eriod of years, t_ake to itself the
management of the public S'choo[ system by unduly pro..
longing the life and functions of the old hoard or by assuming to app·oint the members of the newly created elective Board of Education.
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The legislature has apparently assun1ed that the will
of the electorate, as expressed in the amendment to
Article X, Section 8, can be held in suspense and successfully th,varted until such time as it sees fit to give it effect. It has further assumed that in the meantime it can
la,vfully detern1ine who shall occupy offices upon the
Board of Education and for ho"\v long they may hold such
offices. It has further assumed that such a board may
appoint a superintendent and otherwise function without
early or timely interference by the electorate or any other
agency of government.
The Attorney General supports his contention by
cases which hold, in general effect, that when a constitutional amendment altering the structure of government
requires legislative implementation before the amendment can become functional the status quo shall obtain
until the new constitutional provision is made e.ffective
by legislative implementation: State ex rel Richard-son
v. Ewing, 17 Mo. 515; State ex rel Hudd v. Timme Secretary of State (Wis.) 11 N.W. 785; State v. Scott, 9 Ark.
270; Opinion of Justices, 3 Gray 601 (Mass.). To the
same effect see: Broadwa.ter v. Kendig, et al., 261 P. 264
(Mont.); Andrews v. Neil, et al., 120 P. 383 (Ore.);
Hawley v. Anderson, et al., 190 P. 1097 (Ore.).
The statement that the office to which Mr. Bateman
was elected was not abolished and no vacancy therein
was created by adoption of the constitutional amendment
is just another way of stating that the office to which
Mr. Bateman was elected survived the adoption of the
amendment, and that Mr. Bateman is still the incumbent.
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If the office to which Bateman was elected was not abolished by the mere adoption of the constitutional ainendment, then it survived at least until August 15, 1951.
If it survived, and if no vacancy in the office was created
by the adoption of the amendment, it is because Bateman
still occupies the office. If the act of the legislature
(Chapter 16, First Special Session Laws 1951) accomplished the implementation of the: constitutional amendrnents, it te-rminated, as of August 15, 19'51, both the
office to which Bateman was elected and the offices on
the Board of Education to which the o~ld appointive me.mbers had been appointed. Chapter 16, F'irst Special Session was enacted and approved May 15, 1951, and became effeetive. August 15th.
Some of the cases cited and relied upon by the Attorney General, as well as those cited by us above, would
support the view that the amendments were not intended
to alter the status quo until sufficiently implemented by
legislation to make them operative, within the general
fra1nework of the state government. Until that time,
however, according to some cases, the office to which
Bateman was elected survived and he continued to be the
incumbent. As such incumbent he would be entitled to
only the powers of the office to which he was elected,
and to the, emoluments thereof as fixed by law at the
time he sought and was elected to the, office. Such must
be the result pending the falling in of the effective date
of the constitutional amendments if the cases relied upon
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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by the . A.ttorney General are to be follo,ved. Baten1an's
terin 'Yas shortened only if his office ceased to exist.
It will doubtless be asserted that the effective date
of the runendment to Article X, Section 8, was held in
suspension pending the legislature's leisurely enactment
of in1plen1enting legislation, "\vhile the arnendment to
Article \TIII, Section 1, conveniently took effect on J anuary 1, 1951. Such a contention 'vill be in direct conflict
"Tith the Attorney General's. statement on page· 10 of his
brief that Batema11's office was not abolished and no
vacancy therein 'vas created. Furthermore, it represents
a unwarranted division into two parts of a single plan
and purpose expressed by the electorate 'vhen it adopted
the two amendments. Such a construction would require
us to conclude that the people, having given up the. right
to elect a State Superintendent of Public Instruction
and at the same time having reclaimed the right to elect a
State Board of Education, surrendered its purpose to
the whims of the legislature by leaving the legislature
free to control the Board of Education and thereby
bring about the appointment of a Superintendent of
Public Instruction in direct conflict with the expressed
purpose of the voters.
If the foregoing analysis should appeal to the court
as sound and supported by re·spectable authority, the
court will rule that if Bateman now lawfully occupies the
office of superintendent it is the office to which he was
elected, and he is entitled to only the emoluments of
that office, which amount to $6,000.00 per year.
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PoiNT

II.

OFFICE OF SUPERINTENDENT OF PUBLIC INSTRUCTION AND STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION ABOLISHED.

There is an alternative which we desire to submit
for the serious consideration of the court. If the office
to which Bateman was elected still exists and is not vacant, then Bateman is the incun1bent by force of his election, and he cannot be appointed to an office which he
already occupies by election. He can be appointed to fill
ali office only if such office is vacant.
Both constitutional amendments were adopted by
the people on November 5, 1950. The one substituting
an appointive Superintendent of Public Instruction for
an elective state office became effective by its terms on
January 1, 1951, the one substituting an elective State
Board of Education for the old appointive board became
effective on No;vemher 5, 1950. If at any time after January 1, 1951, Bateman became detached from the office
to which he was elected, with its advantages and disadvantages to him, then it must be so because the adoption of the amendment abolished the office to which he
was elected.. The-re cannot be two offices of State Superintendent of Public Instruction in e·xistence at the same
time: (1) the office to which Bateman was elected, and
(2) the one created by the· amendment. The Attorney
General is forced to detach Bateman from the office to
which he was elected and get him into a new one in order
to save for him the new salary attempted to be voted by
the purported State Board of Education.
If the constitutional amendment brought to an end
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the office to 'vhich Bate1nan 'vas elected, then Bateman
was no longer an incumbent of that office. Likewise, if
the constitutional amendment brought an end to BateInan's office, it brought an end to the offices to which the
old 1nembers of the old Board of Education were appointed. By adoption of the amendment on November
5, 1950, the people abolished the old Board of Education
and substituted a new board in its place, the offices pertaining to which will remain vacant until filled as provided by law. The Constitution provides means to prevent any interregnum. We desire to press this point
further, but will diverge briefly to expose an incidental
but significant point.
The Attorney General devotes one section of his
brief to the argument that the provision of Chapter 16,
Section 2, First Special Session 1951, (75-7-1.50) providing for the election of one member of the State Board of
Education in November, 1951, should be ignored upon
the ground that the entire provision was enacted through
carelessness and inadvertence upon the part of the legislature. This would be our first experience in seeing the
effect of a statute avoided upon the .ground that the
legislature not only did not mean what it said, but did not
mean to say anything upon the su·bject. The chapter
under discussion does impress us as an example of bad
draftsmanship, and the Attorney General could be right
in inviting the radical judicial treatment which he urges.
His reasoning is persuasive and is sup·ported by authority. Bad legislative practices may not, however,
justify the warping or abridging of constituitional proSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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VISions. Whether an election of one board member should
have been held in 1951, and the effect of such failure upon
the competency of the board as such to function, raise
some interesting abstract questions which we forego the
pursuit of to avoid obscuring other points of greater
significance. It may be that a State Board of Education,
otherwise validly subsisting after N ovemher, 1951, might
not have a valid existence in the absence of one elected
member.
The constitutional amendment which teTminated the
existence of the old appointive board, and substituted
in its place an elective board, had its origin in a joint
resolution of the two Houses in 1949. Session Laws 1949,
p. 296. The amendment as adopted was written by the
legislature. The· legislature in drafting the amendment
could have made provisions for susp,ension of the effective date of the amendment until implementing legislation could make it functional. The legislature failed to so
provide.
Not having done so, the amendment which it pro-posed became effective immediately upon its adoption.
See the instructive, -opinion of Chief Justice Hughes in
United States of America v. Chambers, et al., 291 U.S.
216, 78 L. Ed. 763, wherein these statements appear:

"* * * Upon the ratification of the Twentyfirst Amendment, the Eighteenth Amendment at
once beeame inoperative. Neither the Congress
nor the court could give it continued vitality. The
National Prohibition Act, to the extent that its
provisions rested upon the grant of authority to
the c·ongress by the Eighteenth Amendment, imSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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1nediately fell \Yith the "Tithdra,val by the- p·eople
of the essential constitutional support."
Further on, the Chief Justice says:

··*

* * The Congress, while it could propose,
could not adopt the constitutional Amendment or
vary the terms or effect of the Amendment when
adopted. The T\venty-first Amendment contained
no saving clause as to prosecutions for offenses
theretofore committed. The Congress might have
proposed the Amendment with such a saving
clause, but it did not.
And again the Chief Justice said:

"* *

The principle involved is thus not
archaic but rather is continuing and vital,-that
the people are free to withdraw the authority they
have conferred and, when withdrawn, neither the
Congress nor the courts can assume the right to
continue to exercise it."
*

To the same effect se€ State v. Anderson, et al., 166 Atl.
662, 664 (Del.) .
PorNT

III.

CHAPTER 16, FIRST SPECIAL SESSION 1951, UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

During the regular session of 1951, the legislature
failed to enact any implementing legislation. Not until
the special session of 1951 did the legislature get around
to the passage of any law upon the subject. Not only
does the bill as finally enacted merit the criticism of
carelessness, leveled at it by the Attorney General, it is
subject to serious, and, we urge, fatal constitutional objections. We humbly suggest that the legislation was
bad and should have been vetoed by the· GoiVernor.
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By the two amendments of 1950 the people surrendered the right to elect a State Superintendent of
Public Instruction, but took back to themselves the right
to elect the members of the State Board of Education.
The right to elect is certainly one of the fundamental
rights of citizenship. Such rights cannot be unreasonably
. suspended, or the exercise thereof long delayed by the
legislature.
Article I, Section 17, Constitution of Utah:
"All elections shall be free, and no power,
civil or military, shall at any time interfere to
prevent the free exercise of the right of suffrage.
Soldiers, in time of war, may vote at their post
of duty, in or out of the State, under regulations
to be prescribed by law." (Italics ours.)
The 1951 legislature should have promptly provided
for an election forthwith of the entire Board of Education. It could have pro:vided for different tenures for
the several members so that in the future the· entire membership would not be subject to change~ at any one election. In such manner the dete.rmination of the people to
elect the Board of Education would not have been defeated by unreasonable delay and suspension. What the
legislature did was quite different. Under the provisions
of Chapter 16, First Special S.ession, 1951, the electorate will not have a chance to fill the Board of Education
by elected officers until January of 1957-seven years
and two months after the adoption of the amendment.
( Ch. 16, First S·pecial Session, 1951, Sec. 75-7-1.50.)
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If there was an unoccupied office to which Baten1an
was eligible for appointment in 1951, it was because his
old office was gone and he therefore no longer occupied
it. If such were the case then the old offices of State
Board of Education were gone. New offices existed,
but they were vacant. The legislature cannot continue
in existence an office terminated by the Constitution.
People ex rel. Bledsoe v. Campbell, et a.l., 70 P. 918 (Cal.).
In that case the California Supreme Court said:
•'* * * But when the term of office is fixed
by the constitution in definite and precise language, as it is in the case of judges of the· sup·erior
court, it is not competent for the le:gislature! to extend that term."

Scott et al. v. Singleton, et al., 188 S.W. 302 (Ky.).
In that case the Kentucky c·ourt of App·eals said:

"* * * The General Assembly therefore had
the power to prescribe the qualifications and fix
the manner in which the· vacancies should be
filled, but did not have the power to extend the
length of time the appointe·es should hold office
beyond the time fixed by section 152 of the Constitution * * * ."

In re Opinion of the Justices, 171 N.E. 237 (Mass.),
wherein the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
said:

"* * * The tenure of office of judges as thus
settled by the Constitution is imperative and final.
It cannot be enlarged, limited, modified, altered
or in any way affected by the General Court."
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Byrne & Speed Coal Co. v. City of Louisville, 224
S.W. 883 (Ky.), wherein it is stated:
"This rule, however, cannot be applied to
me1nbers of the Legislature or members of legislative municipal boards such as city councils, because the Constitution has in effect and by clear
implication prescribed the terms of members of
the General Asse.mbly and city councils, and it
would not be competent for the Legislature to
extend their terms by providing that they should
hold over until their successors were elected and
qualified or beyond the te-rm fixed in the Constitution."
Neither can the legislature, by appointment, fill vacancies in state offices.

Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v.
State ex rel. Schneider, 191 N.E. 115 (Ohio):
"In this holding we are not denying any right
to the General Assembly to extend the term of
county recorder to four years, the maximum fixed
by the Constitution. But all this can be done
without extending the terms of incumbents for full
two years. Nor are we condemning reasonable
extensions of terms of office to meet constitutional
requirements. We· do hold that, under its constitutional grant of power, the General Assembly
cannot present to an incumbent an extra term of
office."
S.ee also Sta.te v. High, 130 P. 611 (Ariz.)
The point for which we here contend finds support
by clear implication in the opinion of this court in Snow
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v Keddington, 113 Utah 325, 195 P. (2d) 234, wherein it
is said at page 339 :

* * The vice of extending a te.rm is tha.t it
denies the people a chance to select the officer
at the time he should be voted for, but in this case,
if there has been a postponement of an.y election,
the delay has been brought about by the people
themselves."
••*

See also Article ,~~II, Section 9, Constitution of Uta.h,
and Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v.
State ex rel. Schneider, supra.
It is stated in American Jurisprudence, Volume 43,
at page 12 that:

"* * * It has been declared that a legisla.tive
extension of the term of an incumbent is virtually
an appointment of the office for the extended
time, and is void if the office is one that the legislature may not fill by direct ap·pointment."
When the legislature provided for holding ove-r of
the old board members it was either extending terms of
offices which had been cut off by the constitutional
amendment, or it was appointing members to new offices.
Under the cases it was without powe·r to do either.
PoiNT

IV.

OFFICES ON BOARD OF EDUCATION VACANT.

As stated in an earlier section of this brief, there
is a rule of law relied upon by the Attorney General
to the general effect that when a constitutional amendSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ment does not point out the time when or the procedure
by which it is to become effective, its effective date is
suspended until implementing legislation makes the
amendment operative. According to those cases, the old
offices endure for a time unimpaired by the amendment.
If this be the rule then Bateman, in 1951, still held the
office to which he was elected, and the old board me;mbers
the offices to which they were appointed. In such case
the Attorney General cannot be sustained because the
board could not displace Bateman in his office, nor appoint him to a new office. Such a situation 'vould require
two offices existing at the same time.
But the legislature could not seize upon such rule
even if this court adopted it as the law of this state, and
for a long and unreasonable time defeat the will of the
electorate. If the old board members were lawfully held
over at all it is not because the legislature· has so pro-vided. Such holding over, if lawful, was by ope·ration of
law. It is because the effective date. of the amendment
was suspended pending the enactment of implementing
legislation. If the legislature could, under the protection
of such a rule, postpone the time when a full board may
be elected and qualified until1957, it could postpone the
election until 1967, and thus successfully defeat the purpose of the amendment.
In Board of Elections for Franklin County, et al. v.
State ex rel. Schneider, sup~ra, it is stated that:
"It is not necessary to cite cases to the effect
that the inviolability of the right to vote must be
preserved. The physical act of casting a ballot
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

17
1neans nothing, but the expression of that ballot
means everything, and its expression 1nust not be
defeated, directly or indirectly. * * *
"In brief, present inctunbents in the office of
county recorder are given an extra term by the·
General Assembly. S-uch office·rs are thereby
given a full term of office without an elector in the
state having voted for the1n or having been given
an opportunity to vote for them. Is this not a
dangerous departure under a republican form of
government~ If such action on the part of the
General Assembly were given the· stamp of constitutional approval, then subsequent General Assemblies could provide for further extensions ad
infinitum, and the right of the gDiverned to select
their governors would be nullified."
See also Snow v. K eddington, supra, wherein this
court said:
"The general rule is that the te-rm for which
an officer is elected shall be fixed before the. election. This is founded on the principle that the
right of selecting officers for fixed terms belongs
to the people, and the le-gislature is not pe-rmi tte·d
to defeat this right by changing the length of
term of office after an officer has been elected.
"* * * Neithe-r party contends that the voter
can be denied the right to elect constitutional officers and to set the term of office. * * *"
and further on this court says:
"The authorities generally hold that an act
which extends the term of office so as to defeat
the voter's right to elect the officer at the times
p-rovided in the constitution is unconstitutional."
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The implementing legislation provides in part, in
75-7-1, as amended by Chapter 16, First Special Session,
1951, that:
"The State Board of Education shall consist
of nine persons elected by qualified registered
electors * * * ."
The legislature thus defined the new board created
by the Constitution-a new board elective in character
and substituted for the old appointive board discarded
and abolished.
The legislature so far implemented the amendment
as to define the new board. This, under any view of the
law, brought the old board to the end of its existence.
The attempt to defer election of the full board until1956
was an unconstitutional and unreasonable restraint upon
the right to vote. Hence it should be ruled that the. offices
upon the ne·w board are unoccupied and vacant. This is
not speaking in behalf of confusion and interregnum.
The members of the new board are state officers, and as
such the vacancies can and should be filled at once by
the Governor in the exercise of his constitutional power.
Mitchell v. Taylor, 43 P. (2d) 803 (Calif.); Askew v. Bassett, 158 S.E. 577 (Ga.) ; State v. Jorgensen, 142 N.W. 4·50
(N.D.); Waldamer v. Britton, 113 S.W. 1178 (Tenn.);
Article VII, Seetion 9, Constitution of Utah; McCornick
v. Thatcher, 8 Utah 294; 30 Pac. 1091.
The McCornick case just cited deserves special attention. From the decision it appears that the territorial
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legislature on March 10, 1892, enacted a law which contained the following:
~~sec.

5. For the Agricultural College of Utah,
buildings, the sum of $65,000.00; which sum shall
be expended by and under the- direction of a board
of construction, to consist of George W. Thatcher,
Isaac D. Haines and William Goodwin, who shall
receive for their service the sum of $300.00 to be
paid upon the completion of said buildings. Said
board of construction shall each give a bond in the
sum of $25,000.00, to be approved by the territorial auditor, and qualified by taking the official
oath before entering upon their duties. Such
board shall elect a chairman, and warrants for the
money appropriated for said buildings shall bedrawn by the auditor of public accounts upon the
order of such chairman."
The foregoing language was held to create, identify
and enumerate the offices upon the board of construction.
As soon as the act was passed the board came- into existence·. But that part of the act by which the legislature
attempted to fill the offices by appointment was held to
be unlawful as in violation of the· Organic Act. The offices were, therefore, vacant and subject to appointment
only by the Governor.
Here the F'irst Special Session of 1951 gave identity,
body and enumeration to the offices of the newly elected
school board when it said:
"75-7-1. Personnel, Number, Appointment,
Term.
"The state board of education shall consist of
nine persons elected by qualified, registered elecSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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tors according to election districts as hereinafter
provided. * * *"
The implementation embodied in the foregoing is
fully as complete as that contained in the statute reviewed in the McCornick case. It is observed that the
McCornick case was decided before statehood, but the
Organic .Act stood in the place of the state c·onstitution,
and the parallel between the two decisions is in no wise
impaired. The vacancies now existing upon the state
Board of Education should be filled by the Governor in
accordance with the power and authority enjoined upon
him by Article VIII, Section 9, of the Constitution. The
legislature may then be exp.ected to provide for timely
election of the members of the Board.
When the constitutional amendment does not otherwise provide, it takes effect upon adoption. (See United
Stat.es of America v. Chambers, et al., supra.)
The amendment to Article 10, Section 8, was adopted
on November 5, 1950. If by that adoption the abolishment
of the old appointive board and the substitution of the
new board, without defining the number of members
thereof, became· immediately effective, the legislature
could neither extend the life of the old board nor appoint
members to the new one. In such case there was no
validly subsisting board to appoint a superintendent, nor
fix his salary. If, on the other hand, the oJd board remained unaffected by the amendment until the amendment was made functional by the legislature, then the
old board survived until and only until August 15, 1951.
The surviving old board could not in November, 19'51,
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appoint Bate1nan as Superintendent. If the old board and
its officers surYived the an1endn1ent, so did Bateman,
and the office to 'vhich he was elected. The Attorney
General states affir1na tively that the office to which
Bateman "'"as elected 'vas not abolished, and no vacancy
therein was created.
Even if the old board survived the amendment for
a time, it expired "'hen the legislature defined and set up
. its successor. It might have survived a reasonable time
longer if the legislature had provided for timely election
of its successors. In the circumstances the offices upon
the board were and are vacant from August 15, 1951, and
should be filled by the Governor pending further lawful
action of the legislature to give the electorate a timely
opportunity to vote. McCornick v. Thatcher, sup·ra.
We invite the court to hold:

CONCLUSION
1. That Bateman is still occupying the office to
which he was elected, and therefore is entitled only to the
advantages and disadvantages of that office; or,
2. That Bate·man's office was abolished· and his
pretended appointment was not made by a validly subsisting or lawfully existing Board o.f Education.
In either e-vent, plaintiffs are not entitled to the
relief here prayed for, and the alternative writ heretofore issued should be recalled and dismissed.
Respectfully submitted,
PAUL H. RAY,
ALBERT R. BOWEN,
Attorneys for Defendants
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